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REPLY TO ACM'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
Where the Statement of Facts by defendant/Appellee Action Alarm, Inc., dba
ACM U.L. Monitoring Station ("ACM") differs from that of appellant Trace Mineral
International ("TMI"), ACM characterizes and draws inferences from the facts contrary
to the applicable standard of review. Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 435 (Utah 1996)
(on appeal from an order granting summary judgment the Court views the facts and all
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party). To the extent they merit response, ACM's characterizations primarily concern its
common economic interest in the venture with Eagle, the alleged joint venturer, and
ACM's control over Eagle and the venture itself.
With respect to its "common pecuniary interest" with Eagle in the alarm system at
TMI, for example, ACM asserts it "had no interest whatsoever in whether Trace Minerals
paid Eagle/Ashby, and, contrary to Trace Minerals' mischaracterization, Action Alarm
did not provide the central station monitoring i n return for a portion of the monthly fee
Eagle charged TMI for the system.'" Appellee's Brief at p. 8 (emphasis in original).
The material facts, however, are quite clear from ACM's agreement with Eagle:
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2.
[ACM] agrees to provide monitoring and notification
services and [Eagle] agrees to pay to [ACM] pursuant to the current price
list in effect at the time Installer's Subscriber [TMI] is to be put on line for
monitoring service, and be subject to any future price increases. Service for
each subscriber shall be paid for a period of one year or more.

11.
[Eagle] agrees to pay all for any licenses and all sales, use or
business taxes or imposition by municipal, state and /or Federal authorities
in connection with the services to be performed by [ACM] . . . .
Record at p. 293 (emphasis added). Pursuant to this agreement, ACM charged Eagle
$6.00 a month when TMI went on line as a subscriber, and then Eagle, in turn, charged
TMI $20.00 a month. Appellees' Brief at p. 7.
Contrary to ACM's extremely narrow characterization, these facts give rise to a
strong inference ACM and Eagle shared a common pecuniary interest in the venture, and
in fact shared an interest in TMI's payments. ACM's assertions completely ignore the
economic reality that without subscribers, including TMI, Eagle would have no reason to
contract to pay ACM any amounts for monitoring, much less have the wherewithal to
meet its obligations under the agreement.
Similarly, ACM argues "Action Alarm had no right or obligation to control the
alarm design, installation or maintenance business of Eagle/Ashby. Further, it had no
means of controlling the Eagle/Ashby business." Appellees' Brief al p. 8. Citing U.L.
standards and the opinions of its own expert, ACM goes on to assert: "[ACM] has no
duty as a U.L. listed centeral monitoring station under U.L. standards to approve or
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disprove the installation of the alarm systems of its dealers," and ACM "does not bear
responsibility for activities at the protected area involving equipment, location,
inspection, testing, maintenance and runner service." Id. at 9, 11.
These factual assertions both ignore contrary evidence in the record, and take an
extremely narrow view of the parties' relationship, focusing entirely on ACM's control
over the time, equipment or services Eagle contributed to the venture. Id. The inquiry is
actually much broader, however, and examines ACM's control over the venture or
enterprise itself, not the particulars of what the other party contributed to the venture.
Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1088, 1090 (Utah App. 1997) (describing, as one
indicator of a joint venture, "an equal right to a voice in the direction of the enterprise,
which gives an equal right of control.") (emphasis added); Jaeger v. Western Rivers Fly
Fisher, 855 F.Supp. 1217 (D. Utah 1994) ("[A]'mutual right to control' exists in that
each party controls separately a different aspect of the fishing expedition . . . ").
ACM's control over the venture or enterprise, as opposed to the particulars of
how the co-venturer Eagle carried out its own portion of the venture, arises by virtue of
ACM's role as a monitoring station and agreements with Eagle. The Agreement
provides in pertinent part:
1.
. . . [Eagle] shall provide [ACM] in writing the services to
be provided to each Subscriber before [ACM's] acceptance of such
subscriber.
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3.
Service to any subscriber shall become effective only (a)
when [ACM] shall have received a completed Monitoring Service request
Agreement and (b) when [Eagle] shall have sent an acceptable test signal
on the monitoring equipment provided by [Eagle] for the such Subscriber
for each condition which is proposed be monitored for such Subscriber and
said test signals have been received and acknowledged by [ACM] as
acceptable. . . .

7.
This Agreement may be suspended, at [ACM's] option, as to
any subscriber should the protective equipment on the premises of such
subscriber become so disabled or so substantially damaged that further
service to such subscriber is impracticable.
R. at 293.
These provisions giving ACM the power and right to have written information
about the specific services Eagle was providing the subscriber TMI, to test the system
and its signals and acquire additional information about the system, and to determine not
to monitor an alarm system that had to be monitored in order to function as a monitored
alarm system, are evidence ACM exercised control over the venture itself, as well as
Eagle in relation to the venture.
Moreover, ACM's assertions it had no control or duties with respect to the
installation simply ignore the trial court's denial of ACM's motion on TMI's negligence
claim because ACM owed TMI a tort duty of care, which ACM has not appealed. Partial
Summary Judgment, Appellant's Addendum, at Tab 1. It would be anomalous to hold
ACM to a tort duty of care if there were not facts and circumstances to suggest ACM had
sufficient involvement and control and to carry it out.
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Finally, ACM's strident factual assertions regarding the Affidavit of TMFs expert,
Jeffery Zwirn, are not well taken. ACM argues:
Trace Mineral's ninth STATEMENT OF FACT should be stricken and
disregarded by this Court for two reasons: First, it relates solely to the issue of
Action Alarm's duty to Trace Minerals and the negligence claim that was before
the district court and is not before this Court on appeal; second, Action Alarm
moved the district court to strike . . . the Affidavit of Jeffery Zwirn under Utah
R.Evid. 704. Because summary judgment was granted on the issue of joint
venture, the district court did not address Action Alarm's motion to strike the
affidavit of Jeffery Zwirn.
Appellees' Brief at p. 14 (emphasis in original).
If the Zwirn Affidavit were relevant only to the issue of ACM's negligence, and
not to joint venture, as ACM asserts, surely the trial court should have addressed ACM's
motion to strike before denying ACM's motion on the negligence claim. This
inconsistency apparently eludes ACM in its rush to explain why the trial court did not
grant the motion to strike.
Moreover, ACM wholly fails to inform the Court of the bases for the motion to
strike and fact the motion did not seek to strike the entire Zwirn Affidavit. The motion
to strike went only to portions ACM deemed to be "legal conclusions." Record at pp.
560-66. In its brief on appeal ACM makes no showing at all that the facts from the
Affidavit included in TMI's brief are simple "legal conclusions," or otherwise
inadmissible.
In fact, the assertions of the Zwirn Affidavit included in TMI's brief are relevant
to both claims of independent negligence and joint venture. The trial court could not
-5-

find ACM owed a tort duty of care if there were not sufficient facts and circumstances, as
outlined in the Zwirn Affidavit and elsewhere, to suggest ACM had sufficient notice and
information to give rise to a duty and sufficient control and means to implement the duty.
These same elements are relevant to a joint venture inquiry. Restatement (Second) of
Torts § 876 (describing, as one element of joint venture liability, substantial assistance in
accomplishing the tortious result and that the joint venturer's "own conduct, separately
considered, constitutes a breach of duty to the third person.").
ARGUMENT
ACM'S ARGUMENTS DO NOTHING TO CHANGE THE EVIDENCE ON
EACH OF THE ELEMENTS OF JOINT VENTURE LIABILITY WHICH THE
COURT BELOW IMPROPERLY IGNORED OR DISREGARDED IN
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON THE QUESTION
ACM's argument in opposition to TMFs appeal continues the themes developed
in its attempts to characterize the facts as narrowly as possible, instead of in TMFs favor
as required by the applicable standard of review. "Tn reviewing a grant of summary
judgment, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light
most favorable to the nonmoving party.'" Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d at 435, quoting
K&T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 888 P.2d 623, 624 (Utah 1994).
For example, ACM argues throughout its brief that construing the relationship
between itself and Eagle as a joint venture "is akin to finding a joint venture relationship
between the Green Giant vegetable company and Albertson's grocery store. . . . [S]hould
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Green Giant be liable for a slip and fall involving a can of beans in Albertson's grocery
store? " Appellee's Brief at pp. 15, 22.
ACM's own self-serving characterizations and inferences are well illustrated by
the distinctions between this case, and the analogy ACM relies upon so heavily. Suffice
it to say that the trial court denied ACM's motion for summary judgment on TMI's
negligence claim, a motion based on the argument ACM owed TMI no independent duty
of care, because there were facts to suggest ACM had sufficient notice of, and control
over, and involvement with, the particular alarm system at issue to give rise to ACM's
own independent duty of reasonable care to TMI, the alarm subscriber.
This is a dramatically different situation than that presented by ACM's analogy.
Once a can of beans leaves Green Giant's possession, the company has no specific,
express agreement with Albertson's to act together in handling or marketing the beans.
The beans can and will be sold to the ultimate purchaser without any involvement by
Green Giant whatsoever. If Green Giant were sued by a customer involved in a slip and
fall because of the beans, there would be no evidence to suggest Green Giant owed the
consumer an independent duty of reasonable care.
By contrast, in order for a monitored alarm system to be sold to a consumer like
TMI, the monitoring company must be involved in the alarm system. ACM has an
express agreement with Eagle, the Albertsons in ACM's analogy, to provide the
necessary services. The agreement gives ACM an ongoing pecuniary interest in the
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alarm system, and control over the system and its effectiveness. It is undisputed for
purposes of this appeal that there are facts and circumstances to suggest ACM is
sufficiently involved in the ultimate sale of the product, a monitored alarm system, that
ACM, unlike Green Giant, does owe the purchaser an independent duty of care.
ACM goes on to argue the Court should not find it to be part of a joint venture
with Eagle in part because "Action Alarm has over 30,000 accounts that it monitors with
hundreds of dealers throughout the country." The fact is that ACM's behind-the-scenes
participation with these hundreds of alarm dealers allows monitored systems to be sold
and marketed by hundreds of dealers who, unbeknownst to the alarm subscribers, do not
have the financial or other wherewithal to provide the monitoring themselves. To allow
the monitoring company to disclaim all relationship with and responsibility for these
dealers as ACM attempts to do here ignores the realty that the monitoring company's
participation in the ventures is what allows these dealers to sell the alarm systems they
sell. Certainly it fails to protect the purchasers of monitored alarm systems.
These facts and the duties that would normally arise therefrom are expressly
recognized and illustrated by ACM's agreement with Eagle. As ACM indicates, one of
the factors that indicate the existence of a joint venture is "a duty to share in any losses
that may be sustained," "unless there is an agreement to the contrary." Bassett v. Baker,
530 P.2d 1,2 (Utah 1974).
In this regard, ACM's contract with Eagle states in pertinent part:
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8.
The Company [ACM] shall not be liable for any loss or damage
caused by defects or deficiencies in the protective equipment of any Subscriber.
Installer [Eagle] understands and agrees that if the Company should be found
liable for loss or damage due from failure of Company to perform any of the
obligations herein, including but not limited to monitoring or notification services,
or the failure of the system or equipment in any respect whatsoever, Company's
liability shall be limited to a sum equal to the total of one half the annual service
charge or Two Hundred and Fifty ($250.00) whichever is lesser. As liquidated
damages and not as a penalty and this liability shall be exclusive, and that the
provisions of this Section shall apply if loss or damages, irrespective of cause or
origin, results directly or indirectly to persons or property, from performance or
nonperformance of the obligations imposed by this Agreement....
Record at p. 293.
Thus by its own contract, ACM recognizes "a duty" might otherwise exists to
share in losses, and requires Eagle to agree to the contrary. ACM simply ignores these
facts in its whole discussion of Bassett, focusing it analysis as narrowly as possible on
whether ACM could discontinue services if it were not paid. Appellees' Brief at pp. 1618.
ACM's arguments concerning the control requisite for a finding of joint venture
are similarly flawed. Citing cases addressing vicarious liability in the master/servant
context, ACM argues that the control necessary for imposition of joint venture liability
should be the same as that found to impose vicarious liability on an employee instead of
an indendendent contractor. Appellees' Brief at pp. 22-23. ACM goes on to argue the
ways ACM had no control over Eagle itself. Id.
Unhappily, ACM fails to present any support or rationale whatsoever for its
assumption the joint-venture control requirement should be the same or similar as that for
-9-

imposition of vicarious liability in the master-servant situation. Appellees' Brief at pp.
22-23. In fact, as Utah Courts have viewed the situation, the joint venture control
requirement concerns control over the venture or enterprise , not control over the other
party to the venture.
In Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1088 (Utah App. 1997), the Court
described, as one indicator of a joint venture, "an equal right to a voice in the direction of
the enterprise, which gives an equal right of control." Farmers Ins. Exch, 936 P.2d at
1090 (emphasis added). Similarly, in Jaeger v. Western Rivers Fly Fisher, 855 F.Supp.
1217 (D. Utah 1994), the Court noted as follows in denying the defendants' motion for
summary judgment on a joint venture claim because of the existence of fact questions:
Both parties, thus, share a 'community of interest' in the performance of the
common purpose,' namely a successful fishing experience for clients. Because
both parties must work together to be successful, they share a 'proprietary
interest.' Finally, a 'mutual right to control' exists in that each party controls
separately a different aspect of the fishing expedition, based upon expertise.
Id. at 1225 (emphasis added). Compare Betenson v. Call Auto & Equip. Sales, Inc., 645
P.2d 684 (Utah 1982) (discussing "provisions for shared control of the interest or
enterprise " in reviewing joint venture claim).
As set forth above, the provisions of ACM's agreement with Eagle giving ACM
the power and right to have written information about the specific services Eagle was
providing the subscriber TMI, to test the system and its signals and acquire additional
information about the system, and to determine not to monitor an alarm system that had
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to be monitored in order to function as a monitored alarm system, are evidence ACM had
the requisite control over the venture or enterprise, as opposed to the particulars of how
the co-venturer Eagle carried out its own contribution to the venture.
Finally, ACM's arguments concerning cases that have addressed the question of a
monitoring company's liability are unavailing and largely inapposite. The fact is that the
only court that has considered the question whether an alarm monitoring company is
engaged in a joint venture with an alarm installer under a similar legal standard has
determined the issue presents questions of fact which are inappropriate for summary
judgment. Hunter v. BPS Guard Services, Inc., 654 N.E.2d 405, 418-20 (Ohio App.
1995). The differences ACM points out between that case and the instant case are
immaterial.
The other cases cited by ACM do not even reach the joint venture issue. Thus
whether the courts made passing references to alarm monitoring companies as distinct
from alarm dealers in discussing contractual disclaimers or contractual limitations on
liability which are not at issue here is unimportant.
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF REQUESTED
For the reasons stated above and in TMI's opening brief, the trial court's summary
judgment dismissing TMI's claims for joint enterprise liability as a matter of law was
erroneous. The case should be remanded for further proceedings in the district court on
such claims.
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